1949年解密的政策規劃部主任備忘錄// 美國考慮趕走中華民國政府,另外扶植台獨政府應對共產黨入侵
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d402
Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 54–D195
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)81
[PPS 53]
United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores
1.
It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in NSC 37/1,82 37/283 and 37/584 will attain our major objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in Formosa and the Pescadores is degenerating [Page 357]along lines which probably, though perhaps not for two or three years or perhaps in a matter of months, will culminate in Chinese Communist domination of the islands. A review of our policy is therefore in order.
2.
It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administrators from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
3.
There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be brought about.
a.
One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose. (For purposes of illustration, I attach a paper outlining such a course of action, drafted on the assumption that this was the course we would wish to pursue.)
b.
The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral re-assertion of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.
4.
Either of these courses would necessitate a change in the views of the National Military Establishment on the strategic importance of Formosa.*
5.
Either would serve to provide the Kremlin and Chinese Stalinists with a welcome propaganda foil to the growing restlessness in Chinese Communist circles over Russian imperialism in Manchuria (particularly Port Arthur and Dairen).
6.
Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable [Page 358]amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.
7.
The first of the two courses would involve a diplomatic operation calling for great subtlety of approach and for rapid, resolute action, with the most sensitive command of timing. It would, I am afraid, surpass the framework of experience and capabilities of the many people, both here and abroad, who would have to participate in it.
8.
The second alternative would offend the sensibilities of many people in the Department on legal and procedural grounds, and we would probably have to cut some legal corners to justify it.
9.
All the advice I can get in the Department tells me that both of these possible courses should be rejected and that we should reconcile ourselves to the prospect of Formosa’s falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists. I personally feel that if the second course were to be adopted and to be carried through with sufficient resolution, speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance, the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done it, it would be not only successful but would have an electrifying effect in this country and throughout the Far East. I have nothing to support this view but my own instinct. And since the successful execution of the idea would depend on many other people, including the President, having the same instinctive concept and a readiness to assume gladly and with conviction the unquestionably great risks which it involves, I cannot put it forth without reservation as a measured and formal staff recommendation.
10.
My feeling is, therefore, that at this stage you should discuss this with the President and your colleagues in the National Security Council, and should make plain to them that the courses outlined above seem to be the only alternatives to eventual Chinese Communist rule on the islands. If they then feel strongly, as I do, that our situation in the Far East will not permit further inaction in areas where our military and economic capabilities would be adequate to meet the possible commitments flowing from intervention; if they agree, as the NME85 has hitherto been reluctant to do, that Formosa and the Pescadores is such an area; and if they are prepared to assume their full share of the responsibility for initiating and pursuing such a course—then my personal view is that we should take the plunge.
11.
If we are not willing to do this, then we should ask the NSC to note carefully our view that as a consequence the islands are more likely than not eventually to fall under Chinese Communist control; that any later efforts on our part to prevent such a contingency would probably be both tardy and ineffectual; and that we should therefore [Page 359]set about to prepare U.S. and world opinion as best we can for a possible further significant extension of Chinese Communist control—this time to an area close to our military position in the Ryukyus, close to the Philippines, and relatively inaccessible to military attack by land forces from the mainland in the face of even the most rudimentary air and naval opposition, and above all to an area populated by a dependent people for whom we have a certain specific responsibility and for whom such control would constitute an oppressive alien domination.
[ Washington ,] July 6, 1949.
[Annex]
Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff
[ Washington ,] June 23, 1949.
A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores
Preliminary Comment
1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands.
2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates such readiness and ability.
3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist popular support.
4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive. The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with intelligent flexibility.
[Page 360]
Course of Action
5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands, and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting a reply from the NME, we should:
a.
unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8 (The Filipinos are naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against external attack.);
b.
in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the Australian Government along the same lines;
c.
even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the Indian Government;
d.
prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86 with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.);
e.
release for background purposes a small but steady stream of information of this character and information regarding the Formosan reemancipation movement.
6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.
7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith
a.
secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and, if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indians, the questions which were raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the British, Canadians and New Zealanders should be secretly advised of these conversations;
b.
If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and Indian Governments that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated Japan,† make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following paragraph.
[Page 361]
8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down into two main components: (a) the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present period while they are awaiting a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese peace settlement, and (b) the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to their future so that a just and constructive decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the self-determination of the inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores. We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully support those states which will take action along the following lines:
a.
Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores; the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia; they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter,88 this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan. The foregoing notification should be released for publication.
b.
Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores, of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese and of the many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy, the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination. It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:
(1)
Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the island, or
(2)
Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?
These proposals should likewise be made public.
9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this Government should:
a.
propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);
b.
announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
(1)
The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(2)
Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;
(3)
Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive and the chaos and strife which wracked and gutted China Proper now threaten to engulf these islands;
(4)
It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure, that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;
(5)
Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;
(6)
Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good conscience remain silent and inactive;
(7)
In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.
[Page 363]
10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.
11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, … and other channels.…
12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.
13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.
14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.
15. The Generalissimo should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.
16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should [Page 364]always remember that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.
This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.↩
January 19, p. 270.↩
February 3, p. 281.↩
March 1, p. 290.↩
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed, lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3, February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]↩
National Military Establishment.↩
See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.↩
Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.↩
As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.↩
美國對福爾摩沙和澎湖群島的政策
1.
現在看來，在 NSC 37/1、82 37/2 83 和 37/5 84 中提出的政策幾乎不可能實現我們在福爾摩沙和澎湖列島的主要目標——拒絕共產黨擁有這些島嶼通過他們脫離中國大陸的控制。福爾摩沙和澎湖列島局勢惡化[第 357 頁] 沿著這條路線，雖然可能不會持續兩三年或幾個月，但最終會導致中國共產黨對這些島嶼的統治達到頂峰。因此，我們需要對我們的政策進行審查。
2.
現在看來很清楚，唯一合理肯定的機會，就是將台灣和澎湖群島與共產黨人拒之門外，並將這些島嶼與大陸當局隔離開來，將目前的國民黨行政人員從這些島嶼上撤走，並建立一個臨時國際或美國。該政權將援引島民自決原則，並最終在日本和平解決之前進行公民投票，以確定福爾摩沙和澎湖群島的最終處置。台獨是唯一有足夠的基層號召力來抵制共產主義的概念。
3.
可以想像，有兩種方式可以實現這種制度變化。
一個。
一是誘使其他遠東大國帶頭髮起國際行動以達到上述目的。（為了說明的目的，我附上了一份概述這種行動方針的文件，起草時假設這是我們希望採取的方針。）
乙。
另一種是宣布臨時單方面重申對這些島嶼的權威，理由是隨後的事件使《開羅宣言》的所有假設無效，並且美國的干預是為了太平洋地區的穩定利益以及為了島上居民的利益。
4.
這些課程中的任何一個都需要改變國家軍事機構對福爾摩沙戰略重要性的看法。*
5.
任何一種都可以為克里姆林宮和中國斯大林主義者提供一個受歡迎的宣傳陪襯，以應對中國共產黨圈子在滿洲（特別是旅順港和大連）對俄羅斯帝國主義日益增長的不安。
6.
要么讓我們面對最終可能的責任，即以武力將中國軍隊和許多中國難民轉移到大陸。這將涉及相當大的[第 358 頁]大量推人，這會令人不快，並可能導致我們自己的人民和政府內部發生嚴重的道德衝突。
7.
兩個課程中的第一個將涉及外交行動，要求採取非常巧妙的方法，採取迅速、果斷的行動，並以最敏感的時機掌握。恐怕它會超越必須參與其中的國內外許多人的經驗和能力框架。
8.
第二種選擇會在法律和程序方面冒犯部門中許多人的情感，我們可能不得不在法律上走捷徑來證明它的合理性。
9.
我在系裡得到的所有建議都告訴我，這兩種可能的課程都應該被拒絕，我們應該接受福爾摩沙落入中共手中的前景。我個人認為，如果採用第二條路線，並以足夠的決心、速度、冷酷和自信，西奧多·羅斯福可能會這樣做，它不僅會成功，而且會產生激動人心的效果在這個國家和整個遠東地區。除了我自己的直覺，我沒有什麼可以支持這種觀點。而且由於這個想法的成功實施將取決於包括總統在內的許多其他人是否具有同樣的本能概念，並願意欣然並堅定地承擔它所涉及的毫無疑問的巨大風險，我不能毫無保留地把它作為一個衡量和正式的工作人員推薦。
10.
因此，我的感覺是，在這個階段，你應該與總統和你在國家安全委員會的同事討論這個問題，並且應該向他們說明，上述課程似乎是中共最終統治美國的唯一選擇。島嶼。如果他們像我一樣強烈地感到，我們在遠東的局勢將不允許我們在軍事和經濟能力足以履行干預可能產生的承諾的領域進一步無所作為；如果他們同意，作為 NME 85迄今為止一直不願這樣做，福爾摩沙和澎湖群島就是這樣一個地區；如果他們準備承擔發起和推行這樣一個課程的全部責任——那麼我個人的看法是我們應該冒險。
11.
如果我們不願意這樣做，那麼我們應該要求 NSC 仔細注意我們的觀點，即這些島嶼最終很可能會落入中共的控制之下；我們以後為防止這種意外情況所做的任何努力都可能既遲緩又無效；因此我們應該[第 359 頁]我們將盡我們所能準備好美國和世界的輿論，以使中國共產黨的控制可能進一步顯著擴大——這次是在靠近我們在琉球的軍事陣地、靠近菲律賓、相對不易受到陸路軍事攻擊的地區面對哪怕是最起碼的空中和海上反對，從大陸撤出軍隊，最重要的是，向一個由我們負有特定責任的依附民族居住的地區，這種控制將構成壓迫性的外來統治。
[華盛頓] 1949 年 7 月 6 日。
[附件]
政策規劃人員準備的備忘錄草案
[華盛頓] 1949 年 6 月 23 日。
關於福爾摩沙和澎湖列島可能採取的行動方針
初步評論
1. 任何拆除台灣和澎湖現有當局的計劃都會立即遇到兩個嚴重的障礙：( a ) 現在島上約有 300,000 名中國軍隊，他們可能會抵制這種行動；( b ) 本政府更多或中國對這些島嶼主權的承諾較少。
2. 本文不試圖為這些障礙中的第一個提供解決方案。歸根結底，這個問題的答案取決於國家軍事機構是否有能力並且願意按照在奧蘭和達喀爾激勵英國人的原則，在必要時提供必要的力量來製服和驅逐，國民黨軍隊現在在這些島嶼上，並在過渡時期在那裡行使有效的權力。由於這些原因，除非 NME 表明這種準備和能力，否則該計劃無法實施。
3. 本文確實探討了克服阻礙我們的政治障礙的可能性，並提供了一個合理的政治框架，在這個框架內，本屆政府可以訴諸武力，或在必要時積極使用武力，以實現獨立於中國大陸控制的政府，享有堅定的反共民眾支持。
4. 下面的建議是建議性的，而不是確定性的。這裡提出的一般行動方案是如此復雜且充滿了不可預測的元素，如果被接受，它應該以智能的靈活性實施。
[第 360 頁]
行動方針
5. 應按照上述第 2 段的內容進行調查，以確定 NME 是否能夠並願意提供必要的力量，以在必要時制服和驅逐現在在島上的國民黨軍隊，並發揮有效的在那裡有一個過渡時期的權力。在等待 NME 的回复時，我們應該：
一個。
非正式地，通過現有的刪減，就第 8 段中提出的行動方案（菲律賓人自然最不願意將自己置於這個分數，除非這個政府給他們更大的安全感來抵禦外部攻擊。）；
乙。
在不明智地委派這個政府的情況下，以同樣的方式間接接觸澳大利亞政府；
丙。
更謹慎試探印度政府的態度；
d .
在中國與台灣問題的白皮書中準備一章，86特別強調中國自抗戰日以來對島嶼的暴政（白皮書，或至少有關台灣的章節，應在採取行動之前發布第 7 段中規定的線路。）；
e .
為背景目的發布少量但穩定的有關此角色的信息和有關台灣再解放運動的信息。
6. 如果三個政府的反應都是負面的，我們應該根據所了解的情況重新審查本文。
7. 如果反應是肯定的，如果 NME 表示願意展示足以將國民黨軍隊從台灣和 Pescadores 清除的武力，並且如果有必要應用它，我們應該立即
一個。
與菲律賓人、澳大利亞人以及如果與尼赫魯、 87印第安人取得進展的話，秘密和正式討論通過非正式接觸向他們提出的問題。我們應該說，如果他們中的任何一個或全部在這件事上採取主動，我們將準備支持他們並在實際基礎上貫徹執行。在這個階段，英國人、加拿大人和新西蘭人應該被秘密地告知這些談話；
乙。
如果菲律賓、澳大利亞和印度政府普遍同意它們全部或任何一個將台灣問題作為一個需要擊敗日本的大國註意的問題，†請按照以下段落。
[第361頁]
8. 我們認為，福爾摩沙和澎湖列島問題可分為兩個主要部分： ( a ) 在等待中國局勢穩定的同時，需要在當前時期對這些島嶼進行負責任和穩定的管理；日本和平解決方案的最終處置，以及（b) 需要了解島民對其未來的願望，以便在福爾摩沙和澎湖居民自決的基礎上，在和平解決方案中達成公正和建設性的決定。我們認為我們不應該主動尋求解決這些問題，因為（a）它們對菲律賓及其鄰國的關注比對我們更重要，（b）如果我們這樣做，我們會自食其果對“大國干預”和（c) 我們的雙手或多或少地被我們在開羅所做的承諾以及我們在促進中國對這些島嶼的控制方面採取的行動所束縛。雖然我們最不願意在這個問題上帶頭，但我們將大力支持那些將採取以下行動的國家：
一個。
通知所有其他與日本交戰的國家： 通知國嚴重焦慮地看待從中國大陸蔓延到台灣和澎湖列島的混亂和內亂日益增加的威脅；菲律賓記得它只是最近才從這些島嶼入侵和蹂躪；通知國不能毫無顧忌地看待這種對整個東南亞安全的新威脅；因此，他們建議在法律上仍與日本處於戰爭狀態的列強應立即關注日本帝國這一地區的潛在動盪，該地區仍在等待和平解決的最終處置；根據《聯合國憲章》第一百零七條，88這個問題留待與日本交戰的國家採取行動。上述通知應予公佈。
乙。
根據自決原則，在一年內就島嶼的最終處置進行全民投票。還應進一步提議，要求聯合國在進行公民投票時向島嶼居民提出以下備選方案：
(1)
您是否希望由 ( a ) 中國大陸出現的任何政府或 ( b ) 目前在島上的中國當局管理，或
(2)
您是否希望另一種管理形式：( a ) 聯合國託管，( b ) 獨立，( c ) 任何其他形式？
這些建議同樣應該公開。
9. 在第 8 段建議的通知之後的第二天，本政府應：
一個。
向有關政府提議（並公開宣布）與日本交戰的國家的代表在一周的時間內在馬尼拉或堪培拉舉行會議，以就通知採取行動（如有不便，可對該提議提出異議。已提出，但是，我們可以默認在華盛頓或倫敦舉行大使會議。）；
乙。
公開宣布我們對通知的反應：
(1)
前日本帝國的一部分福爾摩沙和澎湖列島的最終處置等待與日本和平解決的決定；
(2)
福爾摩沙群島和澎湖列島目前在中國軍事管理之下，因為美國政府在日本投降時允許中國當局控制這些島嶼，這樣做的決定源於總統在開羅宣言；
(3)
中國和台灣隨後發生的事件並沒有證明採取這些行動的假設是合理的：中國在這些島嶼上的管理一直是貪婪和壓迫的，破壞和摧毀中國大陸的混亂和衝突現在威脅到吞沒這些島嶼；
(4)
開羅宣言和本屆政府促進中國控制這些島嶼的行動本應導致創建對東南亞穩定與安全的威脅，以及福爾摩沙人民四年來所承受的苦難；
(5)
本屆政府希望中國在島上的行政部門可以採取更負責任和建設性的政策，在過去四年中，嚴格不公開宣傳這些島嶼的情況和台灣代表向本屆政府提出的解放呼籲；
(6)
面對進一步惡化而不是改善，以及中國大陸的紛爭和苦難有可能蔓延到福爾摩沙和澎湖群島，本屆政府不能再憑良心保持沉默和無所作為。
(7)
鑑於上述所有情況，本政府宣布它願意支持大多數有關國家的決定，即 ( a ) 在日本和平解決這些島嶼之前對這些島嶼的佔領和管理，以及 ( b ) 未來根據提議的公民投票結果確定島嶼的政治地位。
[第 363 頁]
10.同時，我們要以最快的速度和最有力的準備，為有關權力的會晤做準備。我們應該嘗試與除俄羅斯人和中國人之外的所有人就改變對這些島嶼的佔領和管理問題達成一致意見，讓我們的朋友知道我們願意承擔軍事行動的主要責任。為了盡量減少這種單方面行動的出現，我們應該敦促菲律賓人、澳大利亞人、印度人、巴基斯坦人，
11. 與此同時，我們應該尋求菲律賓人的合作，為台灣自治團體提供一切可能的便利，通過廣播、出版物……和其他渠道在島上和其他地方宣傳他們的情況。...
12. 在有關權力會議上，我們應努力確保在會議召開後兩週內進行島嶼的交接。有關即將開展的行動的細節應在會議上決定。如果中國和蘇聯派代表出席會議，則有必要在正式會議會議之外開展會議工作，然後只專注於以盡可能快的速度通過商定的立場。
13. 一旦會議作出這方面的決定，我們應建立海空巡邏，以防止從大陸進入這些島嶼。同時，我們應盡一切可能為目前在島上的不良中國政治和軍事分子逃往其他地方提供便利，包括加快撤離的船隻。
14.這個時候，我們應該派使者去島上的關鍵人物，孫立人將軍。因為在島上的所有將領中，孫對大陸的希望最小，最有可能抵抗外來強加的變化，所以他能夠做出大力抵抗的絕望行為。明智的做法是給他一個挽救他職位的機會。應該為他提供一個選擇，即宣布自己支持台灣事業並參與新的職業。如果他接受，
15. 應告知蔣委員長，如果他希望留在島上，他將獲得政治難民身份。
16. 在島嶼的接管和隨後的管理過程中，我們應盡量避免扮演顯眼的角色。我們應該[第 364 頁]永遠記住，我們的目標更多是不讓共產黨人擁有這些島嶼，而不是為它們承擔責任，而且我們的影響力可以通過間接和謹慎的手段而不是通過單方面的強硬措施來更有效地發揮作用。
這份備忘錄，PPS 53，根據隨附的消息，於 7 月 6 日被取消；一份說明指出，政策規劃人員的意見將由凱南先生在個人備忘錄中提交；後者未在國務院文件中找到。↩
1 月 19 日，第 270 . ↩
2 月 3 日，第 281 . ↩
3 月 1 日，第 290 . ↩
“參謀長聯席會議的參謀人員認為，此時在福爾摩沙進行任何公開的軍事承諾都是不明智的。儘管台灣具有重要的戰略意義，但目前我們的軍事實力與我們的許多全球義務之間的差距使得在台灣使用武裝力量是不可取的，因為這可能，特別是考慮到外交和經濟步驟失敗的基本假設，導致有必要在那裡進行相對較大的努力，從而使其無法在其他地方遇到更重要的緊急情況。” （NSC 37/3，1949 年 2 月 11 日。）[源文本中的腳註。]↩
國家軍事機構。↩
參見國務院，美國與中國的關係（華盛頓，政府印刷局，1949 年），第 3 頁。307; 另見帖子，第 1365頁 ff。↩
印度總理賈瓦哈拉爾·尼赫魯。↩
本文所用“打敗日本的列強”和“與日本交戰的列強”僅指遠東委員會的代表：美國、英國、蘇聯、中國、菲律賓、澳大利亞、加拿大、印度、新西蘭、荷蘭、法國——加上巴基斯坦和緬甸。[源文本中的腳註。] ↩
1945 年 6 月 26 日在舊金山簽署；59 統計。（第 2 部分）1031、1053。↩
///
以前發過一次
但是剛剛回答別人又想翻出來時,好像是被之前品蔥被攻擊後都沒了
所以再發一次
//中華民國中央政府1949年12月逃到台灣,這是在此之前
這應該能回應很多民國派,認為"美國為與中華人民共和國交好而不會介入"這種觀點假設的有力反駁
Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 54–D195
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)81
[PPS 53]
United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores
1.
It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in NSC 37/1,82 37/283 and 37/584 will attain our major objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in Formosa and the Pescadores is degenerating [Page 357]along lines which probably, though perhaps not for two or three years or perhaps in a matter of months, will culminate in Chinese Communist domination of the islands. A review of our policy is therefore in order.
2.
It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administrators from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
3.
There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be brought about.
a.
One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose. (For purposes of illustration, I attach a paper outlining such a course of action, drafted on the assumption that this was the course we would wish to pursue.)
b.
The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral re-assertion of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.
4.
Either of these courses would necessitate a change in the views of the National Military Establishment on the strategic importance of Formosa.*
5.
Either would serve to provide the Kremlin and Chinese Stalinists with a welcome propaganda foil to the growing restlessness in Chinese Communist circles over Russian imperialism in Manchuria (particularly Port Arthur and Dairen).
6.
Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable [Page 358]amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.
7.
The first of the two courses would involve a diplomatic operation calling for great subtlety of approach and for rapid, resolute action, with the most sensitive command of timing. It would, I am afraid, surpass the framework of experience and capabilities of the many people, both here and abroad, who would have to participate in it.
8.
The second alternative would offend the sensibilities of many people in the Department on legal and procedural grounds, and we would probably have to cut some legal corners to justify it.
9.
All the advice I can get in the Department tells me that both of these possible courses should be rejected and that we should reconcile ourselves to the prospect of Formosa’s falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists. I personally feel that if the second course were to be adopted and to be carried through with sufficient resolution, speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance, the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done it, it would be not only successful but would have an electrifying effect in this country and throughout the Far East. I have nothing to support this view but my own instinct. And since the successful execution of the idea would depend on many other people, including the President, having the same instinctive concept and a readiness to assume gladly and with conviction the unquestionably great risks which it involves, I cannot put it forth without reservation as a measured and formal staff recommendation.
10.
My feeling is, therefore, that at this stage you should discuss this with the President and your colleagues in the National Security Council, and should make plain to them that the courses outlined above seem to be the only alternatives to eventual Chinese Communist rule on the islands. If they then feel strongly, as I do, that our situation in the Far East will not permit further inaction in areas where our military and economic capabilities would be adequate to meet the possible commitments flowing from intervention; if they agree, as the NME85 has hitherto been reluctant to do, that Formosa and the Pescadores is such an area; and if they are prepared to assume their full share of the responsibility for initiating and pursuing such a course—then my personal view is that we should take the plunge.
11.
If we are not willing to do this, then we should ask the NSC to note carefully our view that as a consequence the islands are more likely than not eventually to fall under Chinese Communist control; that any later efforts on our part to prevent such a contingency would probably be both tardy and ineffectual; and that we should therefore [Page 359]set about to prepare U.S. and world opinion as best we can for a possible further significant extension of Chinese Communist control—this time to an area close to our military position in the Ryukyus, close to the Philippines, and relatively inaccessible to military attack by land forces from the mainland in the face of even the most rudimentary air and naval opposition, and above all to an area populated by a dependent people for whom we have a certain specific responsibility and for whom such control would constitute an oppressive alien domination.
[ Washington ,] July 6, 1949.
[Annex]
Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff
[ Washington ,] June 23, 1949.
A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores
Preliminary Comment
1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands.
2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates such readiness and ability.
3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist popular support.
4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive. The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with intelligent flexibility.
[Page 360]
Course of Action
5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands, and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting a reply from the NME, we should:
a.
unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8 (The Filipinos are naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against external attack.);
b.
in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the Australian Government along the same lines;
c.
even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the Indian Government;
d.
prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86 with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.);
e.
release for background purposes a small but steady stream of information of this character and information regarding the Formosan reemancipation movement.
6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.
7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith
a.
secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and, if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indians, the questions which were raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the British, Canadians and New Zealanders should be secretly advised of these conversations;
b.
If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and Indian Governments that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated Japan,† make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following paragraph.
[Page 361]
8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down into two main components: (a) the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present period while they are awaiting a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese peace settlement, and (b) the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to their future so that a just and constructive decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the self-determination of the inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores. We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully support those states which will take action along the following lines:
a.
Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores; the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia; they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter,88 this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan. The foregoing notification should be released for publication.
b.
Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores, of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese and of the many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy, the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination. It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:
(1)
Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the island, or
(2)
Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?
These proposals should likewise be made public.
9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this Government should:
a.
propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);
b.
announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
(1)
The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(2)
Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;
(3)
Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive and the chaos and strife which wracked and gutted China Proper now threaten to engulf these islands;
(4)
It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure, that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;
(5)
Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;
(6)
Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good conscience remain silent and inactive;
(7)
In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.
[Page 363]
10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.
11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, … and other channels.…
12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.
13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.
14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.
15. The Generalissimo should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.
16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should [Page 364]always remember that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.
This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.↩
January 19, p. 270.↩
February 3, p. 281.↩
March 1, p. 290.↩
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed, lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3, February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]↩
National Military Establishment.↩
See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.↩
Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.↩
As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.↩
美國對福爾摩沙和澎湖群島的政策
1.
現在看來，在 NSC 37/1、82 37/2 83 和 37/5 84 中提出的政策幾乎不可能實現我們在福爾摩沙和澎湖列島的主要目標——拒絕共產黨擁有這些島嶼通過他們脫離中國大陸的控制。福爾摩沙和澎湖列島局勢惡化[第 357 頁] 沿著這條路線，雖然可能不會持續兩三年或幾個月，但最終會導致中國共產黨對這些島嶼的統治達到頂峰。因此，我們需要對我們的政策進行審查。
2.
現在看來很清楚，唯一合理肯定的機會，就是將台灣和澎湖群島與共產黨人拒之門外，並將這些島嶼與大陸當局隔離開來，將目前的國民黨行政人員從這些島嶼上撤走，並建立一個臨時國際或美國。該政權將援引島民自決原則，並最終在日本和平解決之前進行公民投票，以確定福爾摩沙和澎湖群島的最終處置。台獨是唯一有足夠的基層號召力來抵制共產主義的概念。
3.
可以想像，有兩種方式可以實現這種制度變化。
一個。
一是誘使其他遠東大國帶頭髮起國際行動以達到上述目的。（為了說明的目的，我附上了一份概述這種行動方針的文件，起草時假設這是我們希望採取的方針。）
乙。
另一種是宣布臨時單方面重申對這些島嶼的權威，理由是隨後的事件使《開羅宣言》的所有假設無效，並且美國的干預是為了太平洋地區的穩定利益以及為了島上居民的利益。
4.
這些課程中的任何一個都需要改變國家軍事機構對福爾摩沙戰略重要性的看法。*
5.
任何一種都可以為克里姆林宮和中國斯大林主義者提供一個受歡迎的宣傳陪襯，以應對中國共產黨圈子在滿洲（特別是旅順港和大連）對俄羅斯帝國主義日益增長的不安。
6.
要么讓我們面對最終可能的責任，即以武力將中國軍隊和許多中國難民轉移到大陸。這將涉及相當大的[第 358 頁]大量推人，這會令人不快，並可能導致我們自己的人民和政府內部發生嚴重的道德衝突。
7.
兩個課程中的第一個將涉及外交行動，要求採取非常巧妙的方法，採取迅速、果斷的行動，並以最敏感的時機掌握。恐怕它會超越必須參與其中的國內外許多人的經驗和能力框架。
8.
第二種選擇會在法律和程序方面冒犯部門中許多人的情感，我們可能不得不在法律上走捷徑來證明它的合理性。
9.
我在系裡得到的所有建議都告訴我，這兩種可能的課程都應該被拒絕，我們應該接受福爾摩沙落入中共手中的前景。我個人認為，如果採用第二條路線，並以足夠的決心、速度、冷酷和自信，西奧多·羅斯福可能會這樣做，它不僅會成功，而且會產生激動人心的效果在這個國家和整個遠東地區。除了我自己的直覺，我沒有什麼可以支持這種觀點。而且由於這個想法的成功實施將取決於包括總統在內的許多其他人是否具有同樣的本能概念，並願意欣然並堅定地承擔它所涉及的毫無疑問的巨大風險，我不能毫無保留地把它作為一個衡量和正式的工作人員推薦。
10.
因此，我的感覺是，在這個階段，你應該與總統和你在國家安全委員會的同事討論這個問題，並且應該向他們說明，上述課程似乎是中共最終統治美國的唯一選擇。島嶼。如果他們像我一樣強烈地感到，我們在遠東的局勢將不允許我們在軍事和經濟能力足以履行干預可能產生的承諾的領域進一步無所作為；如果他們同意，作為 NME 85迄今為止一直不願這樣做，福爾摩沙和澎湖群島就是這樣一個地區；如果他們準備承擔發起和推行這樣一個課程的全部責任——那麼我個人的看法是我們應該冒險。
11.
如果我們不願意這樣做，那麼我們應該要求 NSC 仔細注意我們的觀點，即這些島嶼最終很可能會落入中共的控制之下；我們以後為防止這種意外情況所做的任何努力都可能既遲緩又無效；因此我們應該[第 359 頁]我們將盡我們所能準備好美國和世界的輿論，以使中國共產黨的控制可能進一步顯著擴大——這次是在靠近我們在琉球的軍事陣地、靠近菲律賓、相對不易受到陸路軍事攻擊的地區面對哪怕是最起碼的空中和海上反對，從大陸撤出軍隊，最重要的是，向一個由我們負有特定責任的依附民族居住的地區，這種控制將構成壓迫性的外來統治。
[華盛頓] 1949 年 7 月 6 日。
[附件]
政策規劃人員準備的備忘錄草案
[華盛頓] 1949 年 6 月 23 日。
關於福爾摩沙和澎湖列島可能採取的行動方針
初步評論
1. 任何拆除台灣和澎湖現有當局的計劃都會立即遇到兩個嚴重的障礙：( a ) 現在島上約有 300,000 名中國軍隊，他們可能會抵制這種行動；( b ) 本政府更多或中國對這些島嶼主權的承諾較少。
2. 本文不試圖為這些障礙中的第一個提供解決方案。歸根結底，這個問題的答案取決於國家軍事機構是否有能力並且願意按照在奧蘭和達喀爾激勵英國人的原則，在必要時提供必要的力量來製服和驅逐，國民黨軍隊現在在這些島嶼上，並在過渡時期在那裡行使有效的權力。由於這些原因，除非 NME 表明這種準備和能力，否則該計劃無法實施。
3. 本文確實探討了克服阻礙我們的政治障礙的可能性，並提供了一個合理的政治框架，在這個框架內，本屆政府可以訴諸武力，或在必要時積極使用武力，以實現獨立於中國大陸控制的政府，享有堅定的反共民眾支持。
4. 下面的建議是建議性的，而不是確定性的。這裡提出的一般行動方案是如此復雜且充滿了不可預測的元素，如果被接受，它應該以智能的靈活性實施。
[第 360 頁]
行動方針
5. 應按照上述第 2 段的內容進行調查，以確定 NME 是否能夠並願意提供必要的力量，以在必要時制服和驅逐現在在島上的國民黨軍隊，並發揮有效的在那裡有一個過渡時期的權力。在等待 NME 的回复時，我們應該：
一個。
非正式地，通過現有的刪減，就第 8 段中提出的行動方案（菲律賓人自然最不願意將自己置於這個分數，除非這個政府給他們更大的安全感來抵禦外部攻擊。）；
乙。
在不明智地委派這個政府的情況下，以同樣的方式間接接觸澳大利亞政府；
丙。
更謹慎試探印度政府的態度；
d .
在中國與台灣問題的白皮書中準備一章，86特別強調中國自抗戰日以來對島嶼的暴政（白皮書，或至少有關台灣的章節，應在採取行動之前發布第 7 段中規定的線路。）；
e .
為背景目的發布少量但穩定的有關此角色的信息和有關台灣再解放運動的信息。
6. 如果三個政府的反應都是負面的，我們應該根據所了解的情況重新審查本文。
7. 如果反應是肯定的，如果 NME 表示願意展示足以將國民黨軍隊從台灣和 Pescadores 清除的武力，並且如果有必要應用它，我們應該立即
一個。
與菲律賓人、澳大利亞人以及如果與尼赫魯、 87印第安人取得進展的話，秘密和正式討論通過非正式接觸向他們提出的問題。我們應該說，如果他們中的任何一個或全部在這件事上採取主動，我們將準備支持他們並在實際基礎上貫徹執行。在這個階段，英國人、加拿大人和新西蘭人應該被秘密地告知這些談話；
乙。
如果菲律賓、澳大利亞和印度政府普遍同意它們全部或任何一個將台灣問題作為一個需要擊敗日本的大國註意的問題，†請按照以下段落。
[第361頁]
8. 我們認為，福爾摩沙和澎湖列島問題可分為兩個主要部分： ( a ) 在等待中國局勢穩定的同時，需要在當前時期對這些島嶼進行負責任和穩定的管理；日本和平解決方案的最終處置，以及（b) 需要了解島民對其未來的願望，以便在福爾摩沙和澎湖居民自決的基礎上，在和平解決方案中達成公正和建設性的決定。我們認為我們不應該主動尋求解決這些問題，因為（a）它們對菲律賓及其鄰國的關注比對我們更重要，（b）如果我們這樣做，我們會自食其果對“大國干預”和（c) 我們的雙手或多或少地被我們在開羅所做的承諾以及我們在促進中國對這些島嶼的控制方面採取的行動所束縛。雖然我們最不願意在這個問題上帶頭，但我們將大力支持那些將採取以下行動的國家：
一個。
通知所有其他與日本交戰的國家： 通知國嚴重焦慮地看待從中國大陸蔓延到台灣和澎湖列島的混亂和內亂日益增加的威脅；菲律賓記得它只是最近才從這些島嶼入侵和蹂躪；通知國不能毫無顧忌地看待這種對整個東南亞安全的新威脅；因此，他們建議在法律上仍與日本處於戰爭狀態的列強應立即關注日本帝國這一地區的潛在動盪，該地區仍在等待和平解決的最終處置；根據《聯合國憲章》第一百零七條，88這個問題留待與日本交戰的國家採取行動。上述通知應予公佈。
乙。
根據自決原則，在一年內就島嶼的最終處置進行全民投票。還應進一步提議，要求聯合國在進行公民投票時向島嶼居民提出以下備選方案：
(1)
您是否希望由 ( a ) 中國大陸出現的任何政府或 ( b ) 目前在島上的中國當局管理，或
(2)
您是否希望另一種管理形式：( a ) 聯合國託管，( b ) 獨立，( c ) 任何其他形式？
這些建議同樣應該公開。
9. 在第 8 段建議的通知之後的第二天，本政府應：
一個。
向有關政府提議（並公開宣布）與日本交戰的國家的代表在一周的時間內在馬尼拉或堪培拉舉行會議，以就通知採取行動（如有不便，可對該提議提出異議。已提出，但是，我們可以默認在華盛頓或倫敦舉行大使會議。）；
乙。
公開宣布我們對通知的反應：
(1)
前日本帝國的一部分福爾摩沙和澎湖列島的最終處置等待與日本和平解決的決定；
(2)
福爾摩沙群島和澎湖列島目前在中國軍事管理之下，因為美國政府在日本投降時允許中國當局控制這些島嶼，這樣做的決定源於總統在開羅宣言；
(3)
中國和台灣隨後發生的事件並沒有證明採取這些行動的假設是合理的：中國在這些島嶼上的管理一直是貪婪和壓迫的，破壞和摧毀中國大陸的混亂和衝突現在威脅到吞沒這些島嶼；
(4)
開羅宣言和本屆政府促進中國控制這些島嶼的行動本應導致創建對東南亞穩定與安全的威脅，以及福爾摩沙人民四年來所承受的苦難；
(5)
本屆政府希望中國在島上的行政部門可以採取更負責任和建設性的政策，在過去四年中，嚴格不公開宣傳這些島嶼的情況和台灣代表向本屆政府提出的解放呼籲；
(6)
面對進一步惡化而不是改善，以及中國大陸的紛爭和苦難有可能蔓延到福爾摩沙和澎湖群島，本屆政府不能再憑良心保持沉默和無所作為。
(7)
鑑於上述所有情況，本政府宣布它願意支持大多數有關國家的決定，即 ( a ) 在日本和平解決這些島嶼之前對這些島嶼的佔領和管理，以及 ( b ) 未來根據提議的公民投票結果確定島嶼的政治地位。
[第 363 頁]
10.同時，我們要以最快的速度和最有力的準備，為有關權力的會晤做準備。我們應該嘗試與除俄羅斯人和中國人之外的所有人就改變對這些島嶼的佔領和管理問題達成一致意見，讓我們的朋友知道我們願意承擔軍事行動的主要責任。為了盡量減少這種單方面行動的出現，我們應該敦促菲律賓人、澳大利亞人、印度人、巴基斯坦人，
11. 與此同時，我們應該尋求菲律賓人的合作，為台灣自治團體提供一切可能的便利，通過廣播、出版物……和其他渠道在島上和其他地方宣傳他們的情況。...
12. 在有關權力會議上，我們應努力確保在會議召開後兩週內進行島嶼的交接。有關即將開展的行動的細節應在會議上決定。如果中國和蘇聯派代表出席會議，則有必要在正式會議會議之外開展會議工作，然後只專注於以盡可能快的速度通過商定的立場。
13. 一旦會議作出這方面的決定，我們應建立海空巡邏，以防止從大陸進入這些島嶼。同時，我們應盡一切可能為目前在島上的不良中國政治和軍事分子逃往其他地方提供便利，包括加快撤離的船隻。
14.這個時候，我們應該派使者去島上的關鍵人物，孫立人將軍。因為在島上的所有將領中，孫對大陸的希望最小，最有可能抵抗外來強加的變化，所以他能夠做出大力抵抗的絕望行為。明智的做法是給他一個挽救他職位的機會。應該為他提供一個選擇，即宣布自己支持台灣事業並參與新的職業。如果他接受，
15. 應告知蔣委員長，如果他希望留在島上，他將獲得政治難民身份。
16. 在島嶼的接管和隨後的管理過程中，我們應盡量避免扮演顯眼的角色。我們應該[第 364 頁]永遠記住，我們的目標更多是不讓共產黨人擁有這些島嶼，而不是為它們承擔責任，而且我們的影響力可以通過間接和謹慎的手段而不是通過單方面的強硬措施來更有效地發揮作用。
這份備忘錄，PPS 53，根據隨附的消息，於 7 月 6 日被取消；一份說明指出，政策規劃人員的意見將由凱南先生在個人備忘錄中提交；後者未在國務院文件中找到。↩
1 月 19 日，第 270 . ↩
2 月 3 日，第 281 . ↩
3 月 1 日，第 290 . ↩
“參謀長聯席會議的參謀人員認為，此時在福爾摩沙進行任何公開的軍事承諾都是不明智的。儘管台灣具有重要的戰略意義，但目前我們的軍事實力與我們的許多全球義務之間的差距使得在台灣使用武裝力量是不可取的，因為這可能，特別是考慮到外交和經濟步驟失敗的基本假設，導致有必要在那裡進行相對較大的努力，從而使其無法在其他地方遇到更重要的緊急情況。” （NSC 37/3，1949 年 2 月 11 日。）[源文本中的腳註。]↩
國家軍事機構。↩
參見國務院，美國與中國的關係（華盛頓，政府印刷局，1949 年），第 3 頁。307; 另見帖子，第 1365頁 ff。↩
印度總理賈瓦哈拉爾·尼赫魯。↩
本文所用“打敗日本的列強”和“與日本交戰的列強”僅指遠東委員會的代表：美國、英國、蘇聯、中國、菲律賓、澳大利亞、加拿大、印度、新西蘭、荷蘭、法國——加上巴基斯坦和緬甸。[源文本中的腳註。] ↩
1945 年 6 月 26 日在舊金山簽署；59 統計。（第 2 部分）1031、1053。↩
///
以前發過一次
但是剛剛回答別人又想翻出來時,好像是被之前品蔥被攻擊後都沒了
所以再發一次
//中華民國中央政府1949年12月逃到台灣,這是在此之前
這應該能回應很多民國派,認為"美國為與中華人民共和國交好而不會介入"這種觀點假設的有力反駁
17 个评论
你根本沒有看完
後面他們派人來觀察台獨分子有沒有得救之後
最後得出結論
"我們還是依靠國民黨的孫立人或者是吳國楨吧 那些台灣人根本成不了事"
然後之後 "我們還是先看情況 然後就這樣" 等等等到韓戰爆發
後面他們派人來觀察台獨分子有沒有得救之後
最後得出結論
"我們還是依靠國民黨的孫立人或者是吳國楨吧 那些台灣人根本成不了事"
然後之後 "我們還是先看情況 然後就這樣" 等等等到韓戰爆發
>>陳翠蓮的美國對戰後初期台獨運動的試探與評估(1947-1950)這篇已經把美國務院跟一系列外圍的當時...
這不就是我去年電你的東西嗎？
回去好好研究啊
還是要繼續被我電？
持"蔣家獨裁是對抗中共的必要之惡"觀點的人,是怎麼看蔣家獨裁之下的政府與軍隊實際上是非常腐敗的? - 回复 by @來閒逛的台灣人
https://pincong.rocks/question/item_id-474640
從歷史文獻看台灣國際的定位問題
薛化元
https://pylin.kaishao.idv.tw/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/20091121003.pdf
《臺灣史研究》
第 28 卷第 1 期，頁 129-178
民國 110 年 3 月
中央研究院臺灣史研究所
一九五○年臺灣問題國際化
與國民黨政府的因應對策∗
陳翠蓮
葛超智(George H. Kerr)、託管論與二二八事件之關係
George H. Kerr, Trusteeship, and the 228 Incident
蘇瑤崇(Yao-Chong Su)
國史館學術集刊 ； 4期 (2004 / 09 / 01) ， P135 - 188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v07/d372
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, November 17, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
2248. As further evidence that situation has become so critical Gimo may be willing to act, was conversation I had with him regarding Formosa (our 2241, November 15, 8 a.m.41) News from Formosa continues to indicate maladministration, smouldering discontent and organization of revolutionary activities under capable leadership with objective of virtual autonomy. Gimo was aware of situation and expressed hearty endorsement in principle of some form joint Chinese-American administration of Formosa for a limited period of years with the emphasis on economic rehabilitation.
Since the Secretary’s statement regarding relief to China42 I have received frequent requests for details. I shall therefore greatly appreciate any advance information Department may be able to give.
>>我好像記得有個人跟我說不用跟你這個精神錯亂答非所問的吵
面對我提出的論文
你又開始答非所問謾罵表演~~~
不錯，果然是好好研究了面對論文不掙扎直接開啟謾罵的魯蛇大
好好說說哪一篇論文答非所問了?
持"蔣家獨裁是對抗中共的必要之惡"觀點的人,是怎麼看蔣家獨裁之下的政府與軍隊實際上是非常腐敗的? - 回复 by @來閒逛的台灣人
https://pincong.rocks/question/item_id-474640
從歷史文獻看台灣國際的定位問題
薛化元
https://pylin.kaishao.idv.tw/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/20091121003.pdf
《臺灣史研究》
第 28 卷第 1 期，頁 129-178
民國 110 年 3 月
中央研究院臺灣史研究所
一九五○年臺灣問題國際化
與國民黨政府的因應對策∗
陳翠蓮
葛超智(George H. Kerr)、託管論與二二八事件之關係
George H. Kerr, Trusteeship, and the 228 Incident
蘇瑤崇(Yao-Chong Su)
國史館學術集刊 ； 4期 (2004 / 09 / 01) ， P135 - 188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v07/d372
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, November 17, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
2248. As further evidence that situation has become so critical Gimo may be willing to act, was conversation I had with him regarding Formosa (our 2241, November 15, 8 a.m.41) News from Formosa continues to indicate maladministration, smouldering discontent and organization of revolutionary activities under capable leadership with objective of virtual autonomy. Gimo was aware of situation and expressed hearty endorsement in principle of some form joint Chinese-American administration of Formosa for a limited period of years with the emphasis on economic rehabilitation.
Since the Secretary’s statement regarding relief to China42 I have received frequent requests for details. I shall therefore greatly appreciate any advance information Department may be able to give.
>>你可以用力的公然打手槍沒關係 反正很多ptt的人都知道你是什德行
你可以用力的答非所問人身攻擊沒關係
我在PTT的德性? 這跟品蔥有關嗎?
請問我在PTT認真文即爆文
後面面對你這種絕不針對問題討論只會東拉西扯人身攻擊的煩了
來這寫認真文，在PTT玩對罵
跟美國是否曾規劃趕走國民黨的本文討論有關嗎?
還是你的針對問題回答討論的方式就是拚命針對我攻擊:"你精神錯亂!你不懂!你打手槍! "?
非常特別的針對問題討論(茶)
持"蔣家獨裁是對抗中共的必要之惡"觀點的人,是怎麼看蔣家獨裁之下的政府與軍隊實際上是非常腐敗的? - 回复 by @來閒逛的台灣人
https://pincong.rocks/question/item_id-474640
從歷史文獻看台灣國際的定位問題
薛化元
https://pylin.kaishao.idv.tw/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/20091121003.pdf
《臺灣史研究》
第 28 卷第 1 期，頁 129-178
民國 110 年 3 月
中央研究院臺灣史研究所
一九五○年臺灣問題國際化
與國民黨政府的因應對策∗
陳翠蓮
葛超智(George H. Kerr)、託管論與二二八事件之關係
George H. Kerr, Trusteeship, and the 228 Incident
蘇瑤崇(Yao-Chong Su)
國史館學術集刊 ； 4期 (2004 / 09 / 01) ， P135 - 188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v07/d372
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, November 17, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
2248. As further evidence that situation has become so critical Gimo may be willing to act, was conversation I had with him regarding Formosa (our 2241, November 15, 8 a.m.41) News from Formosa continues to indicate maladministration, smouldering discontent and organization of revolutionary activities under capable leadership with objective of virtual autonomy. Gimo was aware of situation and expressed hearty endorsement in principle of some form joint Chinese-American administration of Formosa for a limited period of years with the emphasis on economic rehabilitation.
Since the Secretary’s statement regarding relief to China42 I have received frequent requests for details. I shall therefore greatly appreciate any advance information Department may be able to give.
把我貼出的論文與國務院文件
放入後續寫作計畫~
其實在二二八之前，美國與國民黨在台灣問題上就有許多衝突了
而這點，其實連台灣人知道的都不多
持"蔣家獨裁是對抗中共的必要之惡"觀點的人,是怎麼看蔣家獨裁之下的政府與軍隊實際上是非常腐敗的? - 回复 by @來閒逛的台灣人
https://pincong.rocks/question/item_id-474640
從歷史文獻看台灣國際的定位問題
薛化元
https://pylin.kaishao.idv.tw/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/20091121003.pdf
《臺灣史研究》
第 28 卷第 1 期，頁 129-178
民國 110 年 3 月
中央研究院臺灣史研究所
一九五○年臺灣問題國際化
與國民黨政府的因應對策∗
陳翠蓮
葛超智(George H. Kerr)、託管論與二二八事件之關係
George H. Kerr, Trusteeship, and the 228 Incident
蘇瑤崇(Yao-Chong Su)
國史館學術集刊 ； 4期 (2004 / 09 / 01) ， P135 - 188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v07/d372
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, November 17, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
2248. As further evidence that situation has become so critical Gimo may be willing to act, was conversation I had with him regarding Formosa (our 2241, November 15, 8 a.m.41) News from Formosa continues to indicate maladministration, smouldering discontent and organization of revolutionary activities under capable leadership with objective of virtual autonomy. Gimo was aware of situation and expressed hearty endorsement in principle of some form joint Chinese-American administration of Formosa for a limited period of years with the emphasis on economic rehabilitation.
Since the Secretary’s statement regarding relief to China42 I have received frequent requests for details. I shall therefore greatly appreciate any advance information Department may be able to give.
放入後續寫作計畫~
其實在二二八之前，美國與國民黨在台灣問題上就有許多衝突了
而這點，其實連台灣人知道的都不多
持"蔣家獨裁是對抗中共的必要之惡"觀點的人,是怎麼看蔣家獨裁之下的政府與軍隊實際上是非常腐敗的? - 回复 by @來閒逛的台灣人
https://pincong.rocks/question/item_id-474640
從歷史文獻看台灣國際的定位問題
薛化元
https://pylin.kaishao.idv.tw/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/20091121003.pdf
《臺灣史研究》
第 28 卷第 1 期，頁 129-178
民國 110 年 3 月
中央研究院臺灣史研究所
一九五○年臺灣問題國際化
與國民黨政府的因應對策∗
陳翠蓮
葛超智(George H. Kerr)、託管論與二二八事件之關係
George H. Kerr, Trusteeship, and the 228 Incident
蘇瑤崇(Yao-Chong Su)
國史館學術集刊 ； 4期 (2004 / 09 / 01) ， P135 - 188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v07/d372
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, November 17, 1947—3 p.m.
[Received 7:10 p.m.]
2248. As further evidence that situation has become so critical Gimo may be willing to act, was conversation I had with him regarding Formosa (our 2241, November 15, 8 a.m.41) News from Formosa continues to indicate maladministration, smouldering discontent and organization of revolutionary activities under capable leadership with objective of virtual autonomy. Gimo was aware of situation and expressed hearty endorsement in principle of some form joint Chinese-American administration of Formosa for a limited period of years with the emphasis on economic rehabilitation.
Since the Secretary’s statement regarding relief to China42 I have received frequent requests for details. I shall therefore greatly appreciate any advance information Department may be able to give.
已隐藏
已隐藏
已隐藏
还有孙立人，自由中国第三势力
美国一般要准备许多方案，根据情况取舍
美国一般要准备许多方案，根据情况取舍